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passengers than any other U.S. airline.
How do the LCCs serve up cheap flights? Aptly named,
they operate within a business model that allows them to keep
costs down, run more efficiently, and thus charge lower fares.
The defining characteristic of the LCCs is that they have a 
relatively nondiverse fleet of jets. Frontier Airlines runs only
three types of jets. The rest of the LCCs fly either one or two.
Notably, at the end of 2008 Southwest had the third-largest
fleet of jets in the industry (after the Delta/Northwest merg-
er) at 537 jets and they’re all 737s. 
Ahomogeneous fleet saves the LCCs bundles in terms of
maintenance and staff training since they don’t need to train
staff on how to repair and operate multiple types of jets.
This helps the LCCs better utilize their staff, including
cross-training them on lots of jobs — which is why you may
have noticed that the person who checked your bags on your
last LCC flight also appeared on board to deliver your
peanuts. The LCCs are also known for offering “no frills”
service by sometimes eliminating seat assignments, in-flight
meals, and entertainment. They often have an uncomplicat-
ed fare structure, sometimes selling only one-way flights.
These simplifying features streamline flight operations.
This lean business model has created a considerable cost
advantage in terms of “cost per available seat mile” (CASM)
— or the cost of flying one airline seat for one mile. Over
time, consulting firm Oliver Wyman estimates the LCCs
operate about 25 percent more cheaply than the legacies in
terms of CASM. No legacy carrier beats any LCC in terms of
this cost measure. The cost gap between the two groups in
absolute terms has also widened over time, despite avid cost-
cutting measures by the legacies. As much as 65 percent of
the cost advantage of the LCCs may be attributable to its
simplified business model, according to consulting firm
Booz Allen Hamilton.
Labor remains the biggest expense for airlines, between
one-quarter and one-third of total operating expenses. But
because the LCCs are able to better manage other costs, this
is not an impediment. Southwest in particular is so good at
keeping costs down that it completely compensates for the
fact that it has the most expensive labor force of the major
airlines as a percentage of its CASM. Its labor force is 77 
percent unionized, and its staff and pilots make among the
highest incomes in the industry, with the biggest benefits
packages — yet Southwest still has among the lowest CASM
in the industry. 
Coming to a Hub Near You
Another key difference between legacies and LCCs is the
routes they fly. The airline industry was heavily regulated
prior to 1978, with the Civil Aeronautics Board determining
what routes airlines could fly and what fares they could
charge. Thus, in effect the government determined the mar-
ket share of each airline. Decisions were typically made
based on what would best serve the “public interest.” (The
holdover from this regulatory regime is the painstaking
merger approval process that still exists for airlines today.)
After deregulation in 1978, American Airlines pioneered
a new method for determining routes. They funneled all
their passengers through one common location, called a
hub, bundled them into common connecting flights, and
shipped passengers out from there to the final destinations.
By accumulating passengers in one location, the legacy air-
lines could schedule a greater number of flights, serve more
cities, and earn more revenue. This became known as the
“hub-and-spoke” setup, and all the airlines at the time 
quickly adopted it. 
But the hub-and-spoke model does come with some
costs. Key to the model is amassing lots of passengers into
the hub at peak points during the day to fill outgoing flights
and minimize the amount of time that planes are left idle
waiting for passengers. Idle time means lost revenue. “You
wind up piling up everybody and trying to get them in and
out at the same time,” says Greenslet. It also means the air-
lines must build in time between flights to move bags, staff,
and passengers from one flight to the next.  
The LCCs revolutionized commercial flying by providing
direct flights under a “point-to-point” model, with no 
hub at all. The LCCs provide more flights that run directly 
from one city to another, even if neither city is particularly
large. The reduced congestion and idle time allows 
LCCs to get planes back in the air more quickly. “The 
LCCs’ planes are more productive. They’re flying 11 to 13 
hours a day, compared to 9 to 11 hours a day for the legacies,” 
says Cordle. This business model turned the costs and 
benefits of hub-and-spoke airlines on its head: The point-
to-point model is less costly in part because it reduces idle
time, but offers less in connectivity and flight times, and
therefore risks accumulating fewer passengers per flight.
Over time, cost-conscious vacationers, who are relatively
flexible on flight times, have come to rely on the lower-fare
LCCs, while business travelers, for whom connectivity and
scheduling convenience is most important, have stuck with
the legacy carriers.
Meeting in the Aisle
In some ways the business models of the LCC and legacy 





























































































































































Volatile Profits for the Airline Industry
U.S. passenger and cargo airlines
SOURCE: Air Transport Association
Operating Revenue Profit 
L
ooking for a flight out of Charlotte, N.C.? You’ll have
3.6 percent fewer flight options by June 2009 com-
pared to the same month last year. Excited to spend
a summer week in Myrtle Beach, S.C.? You’ll have 7.3
percent fewer flights for getting home than you would have
had last summer. Even our nation’s capital has seen about
6.5 percent fewer flights departing from Washington Dulles
International Airport this June compared to June 2008.
The main reason behind the capacity cuts at most of the
country’s major airports, of course, is the recession. When
the economy turns sour, people fly less. Since it doesn’t pay
to fly empty planes, airlines cut capacity by running fewer
flights or swapping big planes for smaller ones. “Right now
there are too many seats chasing too few passengers,” says
Vaughn Cordle of AirlineForecasts, an industry consulting
group. 
But any seasoned traveler knows the recession is just the
latest in a series of shocks to hit the airline industry in this
decade. Oil prices — a key determinant of jet fuel prices and,
to a lesser extent, would-be travelers’ expendable cash —
spiked to a record-breaking $147 per barrel in July 2008. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to huge costs for the 
industry in the form of security protocols, and they 
worried travelers, many of whom opted to just stay home. 
The airline industry as a whole has been profitable for
only two years during this decade, 2006 and 2007. They
booked a loss again in 2008, and industry analysts are split
on what’s in the cards for this year. Analysts do agree, how-
ever, that because of the succession of shocks the industry
has experienced, and the emergence of a new breed 
of competitors, we may be at a turning point in the 
airline industry that could change how airlines operate in 
the future.
Turbulence On the Books
In order to keep this in perspective, it is important to note
that the airline industry has never been consistently prof-
itable. This is mostly a result of its structure. Airlines have
large upfront fixed costs for their fleet of jets, but their real
product is seats on those planes. They charge a fare for each
seat that is well above the marginal cost of flying one addi-
tional passenger in order to recoup those fixed costs over
time.
With the exception of fuel, airlines’ costs are relatively
stable. The real uncertainty that they face is exceptionally
erratic demand resulting from business cycles, and they are
more sensitive to weather patterns and geopolitical turmoil
than perhaps any other industry in existence. The airline
industry experienced its first-ever decline in world traffic
volume in 1991, an outcome of anxiety over traveling during
the Gulf War. Other notable extremes since have included
airlines’ high-profit years during the dot-com boom, the sub-
sequent decline in global air travel following 9/11 and the
current financial crisis. The International Air Transport
Association (IATA) predicts global passenger traffic will fall
by 3 percent in 2009. Despite the industry’s cyclicality, this
is only the third time in the last 35 years that passenger 
traffic has fallen. This may be one reason why industry ana-
lysts are now speculating on whether the industry’s oldest
players will survive in their current form.
In an industry whose profits are so volatile, it is no 
surprise that the competitive landscape for airlines is con-
stantly changing through mergers, bankruptcies, and
liquidations. A small handful of airlines have stayed in the
game since the industry was deregulated in 1978. These 
so-called “legacy carriers” include some of the country’s
biggest names in air travel: American, Continental, United,
US Airways, Delta, and Northwest (the latter two of which
merged in October 2008 and are in the process of being fully
integrated under Delta’s brand). They have seen their share
of financial distress.
When times are tough for airlines, new competitors tend
to enter or expand in the market when aircraft, labor, and
airport space are cheaper. They also gobble up any routes
that have been abandoned by existing airlines. In the last
two decades, the most intense competition has come from
the so-called “low-cost carriers,” or LCCs. The LCCs are the
group of airlines — the names Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran,
Allegiant, and Frontier, the biggest of the LCCs, might ring
a bell — known for offering cheap fares for flights all over
the country. The LCCs aren’t always the cheapest flight
option, but many times they are. Customers have increas-
ingly chosen them over the legacy carriers. 
This is because seats are a commodity. They are not 
easily differentiated among airlines and have no intrinsic
value on their own — people fly to get somewhere, not for
the sake of taking a flight. The airline’s sole aim is to control
the supply of that commodity relative to its competitors in
order tomanage the fares at a profitable level, or carry more
traffic for a given fare. 
The commodity nature of seats means that price is king
in the airline industry: The airline that offers the cheapest
flight for a given market will usually win the customer.
Because the LCCs tend to offer cheaper flights, they 
often act as price-setters for the rest of the industry and
“everyone else has to scramble to meet them,” according to
Edmund Greenslet, author of The Airline Monitor, an indus-
try publication. The market share of the LCCs has grown
from about one-tenth of the industry in the early ’90s to
over one-quarter in 2008. Southwest now carries more 
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in the airline industry: The airline that offers the cheapest
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Berkeley believes there appears to be a single “hybrid” air-
line model emerging. “The idea that some airlines have 
the ‘right’ business model is nonsense. I think we’ll see
LCCs move increasingly toward hubbing, and I think we’ll
continue to see the legacy carriers move in the opposite
direction and streamline,” he says. “We’re definitely seeing
the two models merge.”
Landing on Common Ground
The legacy and low-cost carriers will face some issues that
both will find hard to ignore. One is the possible adoption of
a federal “cap and trade” emissions control program that
threatens to dramatically raise their cost of jet fuel. Another
is an outdated air traffic control system that forces costly
delays. Of course, economic cyclicality will continue to
plague the airlines. The industry expands and contracts in
line with, and at roughly twice the pace of, the overall econ-
omy. When the economy slows, so does travel demand as
businesses tighten their travel budgets and individuals opt
for fewer recreational trips. 
In the future, Cordle expects an airline industry that is
smaller overall. “Because of excess spending and consump-
tion in the United States since the early 2000s, with twin
bubbles in stocks and housing, expenditures on air travel
were inflated above long-run trend,” he says. “Now we’re
getting back to the reality of what the consumers can actu-
ally manage. When you strip away all the noise, it really
means the industry will be 10 percent or so smaller.”
This can take place through mergers or capacity cuts —
both of which can be aided by Chapter 11 bankruptcy, to
which the airlines are no stranger. Of the six legacy carriers,
four have filed for bankruptcy since the year 2000. There
have been more than 40 airline bankruptcies overall in this
decade alone. It’s a normal course of business that helps the
airlines renegotiate existing contracts, especially those with
organized labor. “The airline industry’s labor costs have
come down 40 percent since 2000,” Cordle estimates, “and
much of that was accomplished through bankruptcy or near
bankruptcy positions.” He says that one airline got conces-
sions from pilots as the lawyers were essentially walking up
the steps of the court to file. This sort of negotiation has
been a standard way for airlines to deal with labor costs 
during hard financial times.
Mergers are the way to go, according to Cordle, in part
because he views the legacies’ pension obligations as unsus-
tainable. “Mergers can be win-win-win. Win for the
customer, shareholder, and employees.” Amerger’s ultimate
impact on consumers depends on the airlines involved. 
For example, if the two airlines have largely overlapping
routes, then consumers can be harmed because the airlines
will eliminate the overlap which reduces the total network
available to passengers, according to Berry. However, if the
airlines have complementary networks, then mergers have
the potential to create a broader network overall for con-
sumers. “The government looks out for this and impedes
mergers where the potential harm for consumers is greater,”
Berry says.
No matter what changes influence the new business
models, it’s hard to imagine a world without airlines. For U.S.
airlines, there are 31,000 scheduled departures ferrying an
average of 2.1 million passengers each day. The Federal
Aviation Administration predicts global air traffic will 
double by 2025. The FAA also estimates that the industry
adds more than 5 percent to U.S. gross domestic product
through its direct and indirect economic impacts, and is
responsible for nearly 10 million jobs in industries (other
than airlines) related to hospitality and travel — even
though U.S. spending on air travel is less than 1 percent of
GDP, and airlines directly employ just over half a million
people. “There is tremendous spillover that ripples through
the entire economy,” Cordle says.
From the passenger’s perspective, ongoing capacity cuts
by the airlines will mean “more crowded aircraft, less quality
of service, yet better on-time performance because there are
fewer capacity bottlenecks,” Cordle sums up.
Boyd is also keen to put the ever-changing airline indus-
try into perspective: “Flying will continue to be just as
uncomfortable as ever in the same seat space,” Boyd says.
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directly for market share, they’re picking up each other’s
habits. Legacy carriers have started to mimic some of the
streamlined features of the LCCs. Many legacy carriers
increasingly charge for, or eliminate, the “frills” of air travel.
They have paid attention to the cost-minimizing innova-
tions pioneered by the LCCs, like the fuel hedges that have
famously saved Southwest billions. 
Some have also migrated to “rolling hubs.” Traditional
hubs schedule many planes to land and depart around the
same time during peak hours, which reduces the layovers
with which passengers must deal but leads to costly conges-
tion. Rolling hubs, on the other hand, smooth flights over
the day rather than coordinating many flights to take off and
land around the same time. This reduces congestion and gets
planes back in the air more quickly.
As the LCCs have grown, their traffic has inevitably
accumulated in certain cities where demand is strong. As a
result, low-cost carriers increasingly operate out of hubs,
they just might not call them that. Many of the LCCs
instead call these de facto hubs “focus cities” or “gateways.”
Therefore it is something of a misnomer to say that the
LCCs operate strictly with a point-to-point model, accord-
ing to Mike Boyd of Boyd Group International, an airline
forecasting firm based out of Colorado. Southwest, for
example, specifically calls itself a “point-to-point” airline,
even though Boyd estimates as much as a third of its flights
are connecting traffic. The LCCs don’t make a concerted
effort to market themselves as hub carriers, and many are
still much less reliant on hubs than the legacies.
Resorting to a partial hub system has allowed the LCCs
to offer the greater connectivity that the legacy airlines do.
This has expanded the number of markets they serve. They
have also begun to target “the most lucrative passenger, the
business traveler,” by offering more perks and frequent flier
programs, “and that’s the bread and butter of the legacies,”
according to Cordle. He estimates that business travelers are
8 percent to 12 percent of the passengers for legacy carriers,
but they are about 35 percent to 45 percent of their revenue,
and in some cases as much as half. 
It looks as though hubs are here to stay, even though, by
some measures, they’re more expensive to run. Hubs may be
the only way to serve a country of our size and composition.
“Acountry like ours, with a lot of population centers, gener-
ates a lot of travel demand even for relatively small cities, 
but not always enough traffic to support a direct flight to
another medium-sized town. The only way to serve all those
points is to hub the traffic,” says Greenslet. “The train sys-
tem does that in Europe. The hub-and-spoke system does
that in this country.”
As the LCCs saturate their existing markets, they have
two options if they want to keep growing. They can branch
into small-city short-haul traffic currently served by the
regional airlines — the small, 50- to 70-seat airlines that serve
very small cities, often as a subsidiary of a legacy carrier. Or,
they can branch into long-haul (generally defined as six or
more hours) and international travel like the legacies. The
LCCs can’t expect to continually branch into these areas
while maintaining only one or two types of jets. However,
buying an array of new jets departs rather dramatically from
the business model that has kept their costs so low to begin
with. “Right now they’re too big to go to Montgomery, Ala.,
and too small to go to Shanghai,” Boyd says.
What this means is that the low-hanging fruit for the
LCCs may be just about gone. They used their novel busi-
ness model to connect markets in a way that didn’t
previously exist — point-to-point service between midsized
cities that created a low-cost alternative for people who
would otherwise drive 300 miles to their destination. In
other words, the LCCs expanded overall demand instead of
taking it away from their competitors. As they’ve grown,
they’ve moved into big-city markets and have been largely
successful at undercutting the legacies for many flights. But
they won’t be able to keep growing without fighting tooth
and nail to take that market share from the legacy carriers,
especially if consumer demand continues to fall. 
What’s more, the cost advantages that made them so 
successful to begin with may be dwindling. Their planes
are becoming less fuel efficient as they age. Labor costs are 
getting higher too: Their staffs are gaining tenure and airline
wages are determined on a graduated scale by seniority. It’s
not obvious what more they can do to win market share
from the legacy carriers and keep their cost advantage. “The
big thing you’ll continue to see is that the legacy carriers will
keep pushing to lower their cost structure,” says Yale
University economist Steven Berry. “But the degree to 
which the LCCs can adopt the hub system, for example, is
less certain.” But don’t be too fast to discount the innovative
LCCs. Since it has been around since the 1970s, low-cost
behemoth Southwest is a living case study of an aging LCC
and it has only seemed to get stronger. Regarding its pur-
ported disappearing cost advantages, “I’ve been saying that
about Southwest for about 30 years. So far aging has had no
major affect,” Greenlist says. 
In light of the changes that have taken place, economist
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omy. When the economy slows, so does travel demand as
businesses tighten their travel budgets and individuals opt
for fewer recreational trips. 
In the future, Cordle expects an airline industry that is
smaller overall. “Because of excess spending and consump-
tion in the United States since the early 2000s, with twin
bubbles in stocks and housing, expenditures on air travel
were inflated above long-run trend,” he says. “Now we’re
getting back to the reality of what the consumers can actu-
ally manage. When you strip away all the noise, it really
means the industry will be 10 percent or so smaller.”
This can take place through mergers or capacity cuts —
both of which can be aided by Chapter 11 bankruptcy, to
which the airlines are no stranger. Of the six legacy carriers,
four have filed for bankruptcy since the year 2000. There
have been more than 40 airline bankruptcies overall in this
decade alone. It’s a normal course of business that helps the
airlines renegotiate existing contracts, especially those with
organized labor. “The airline industry’s labor costs have
come down 40 percent since 2000,” Cordle estimates, “and
much of that was accomplished through bankruptcy or near
bankruptcy positions.” He says that one airline got conces-
sions from pilots as the lawyers were essentially walking up
the steps of the court to file. This sort of negotiation has
been a standard way for airlines to deal with labor costs 
during hard financial times.
Mergers are the way to go, according to Cordle, in part
because he views the legacies’ pension obligations as unsus-
tainable. “Mergers can be win-win-win. Win for the
customer, shareholder, and employees.” Amerger’s ultimate
impact on consumers depends on the airlines involved. 
For example, if the two airlines have largely overlapping
routes, then consumers can be harmed because the airlines
will eliminate the overlap which reduces the total network
available to passengers, according to Berry. However, if the
airlines have complementary networks, then mergers have
the potential to create a broader network overall for con-
sumers. “The government looks out for this and impedes
mergers where the potential harm for consumers is greater,”
Berry says.
No matter what changes influence the new business
models, it’s hard to imagine a world without airlines. For U.S.
airlines, there are 31,000 scheduled departures ferrying an
average of 2.1 million passengers each day. The Federal
Aviation Administration predicts global air traffic will 
double by 2025. The FAA also estimates that the industry
adds more than 5 percent to U.S. gross domestic product
through its direct and indirect economic impacts, and is
responsible for nearly 10 million jobs in industries (other
than airlines) related to hospitality and travel — even
though U.S. spending on air travel is less than 1 percent of
GDP, and airlines directly employ just over half a million
people. “There is tremendous spillover that ripples through
the entire economy,” Cordle says.
From the passenger’s perspective, ongoing capacity cuts
by the airlines will mean “more crowded aircraft, less quality
of service, yet better on-time performance because there are
fewer capacity bottlenecks,” Cordle sums up.
Boyd is also keen to put the ever-changing airline indus-
try into perspective: “Flying will continue to be just as
uncomfortable as ever in the same seat space,” Boyd says.
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directly for market share, they’re picking up each other’s
habits. Legacy carriers have started to mimic some of the
streamlined features of the LCCs. Many legacy carriers
increasingly charge for, or eliminate, the “frills” of air travel.
They have paid attention to the cost-minimizing innova-
tions pioneered by the LCCs, like the fuel hedges that have
famously saved Southwest billions. 
Some have also migrated to “rolling hubs.” Traditional
hubs schedule many planes to land and depart around the
same time during peak hours, which reduces the layovers
with which passengers must deal but leads to costly conges-
tion. Rolling hubs, on the other hand, smooth flights over
the day rather than coordinating many flights to take off and
land around the same time. This reduces congestion and gets
planes back in the air more quickly.
As the LCCs have grown, their traffic has inevitably
accumulated in certain cities where demand is strong. As a
result, low-cost carriers increasingly operate out of hubs,
they just might not call them that. Many of the LCCs
instead call these de facto hubs “focus cities” or “gateways.”
Therefore it is something of a misnomer to say that the
LCCs operate strictly with a point-to-point model, accord-
ing to Mike Boyd of Boyd Group International, an airline
forecasting firm based out of Colorado. Southwest, for
example, specifically calls itself a “point-to-point” airline,
even though Boyd estimates as much as a third of its flights
are connecting traffic. The LCCs don’t make a concerted
effort to market themselves as hub carriers, and many are
still much less reliant on hubs than the legacies.
Resorting to a partial hub system has allowed the LCCs
to offer the greater connectivity that the legacy airlines do.
This has expanded the number of markets they serve. They
have also begun to target “the most lucrative passenger, the
business traveler,” by offering more perks and frequent flier
programs, “and that’s the bread and butter of the legacies,”
according to Cordle. He estimates that business travelers are
8 percent to 12 percent of the passengers for legacy carriers,
but they are about 35 percent to 45 percent of their revenue,
and in some cases as much as half. 
It looks as though hubs are here to stay, even though, by
some measures, they’re more expensive to run. Hubs may be
the only way to serve a country of our size and composition.
“Acountry like ours, with a lot of population centers, gener-
ates a lot of travel demand even for relatively small cities, 
but not always enough traffic to support a direct flight to
another medium-sized town. The only way to serve all those
points is to hub the traffic,” says Greenslet. “The train sys-
tem does that in Europe. The hub-and-spoke system does
that in this country.”
As the LCCs saturate their existing markets, they have
two options if they want to keep growing. They can branch
into small-city short-haul traffic currently served by the
regional airlines — the small, 50- to 70-seat airlines that serve
very small cities, often as a subsidiary of a legacy carrier. Or,
they can branch into long-haul (generally defined as six or
more hours) and international travel like the legacies. The
LCCs can’t expect to continually branch into these areas
while maintaining only one or two types of jets. However,
buying an array of new jets departs rather dramatically from
the business model that has kept their costs so low to begin
with. “Right now they’re too big to go to Montgomery, Ala.,
and too small to go to Shanghai,” Boyd says.
What this means is that the low-hanging fruit for the
LCCs may be just about gone. They used their novel busi-
ness model to connect markets in a way that didn’t
previously exist — point-to-point service between midsized
cities that created a low-cost alternative for people who
would otherwise drive 300 miles to their destination. In
other words, the LCCs expanded overall demand instead of
taking it away from their competitors. As they’ve grown,
they’ve moved into big-city markets and have been largely
successful at undercutting the legacies for many flights. But
they won’t be able to keep growing without fighting tooth
and nail to take that market share from the legacy carriers,
especially if consumer demand continues to fall. 
What’s more, the cost advantages that made them so 
successful to begin with may be dwindling. Their planes
are becoming less fuel efficient as they age. Labor costs are 
getting higher too: Their staffs are gaining tenure and airline
wages are determined on a graduated scale by seniority. It’s
not obvious what more they can do to win market share
from the legacy carriers and keep their cost advantage. “The
big thing you’ll continue to see is that the legacy carriers will
keep pushing to lower their cost structure,” says Yale
University economist Steven Berry. “But the degree to 
which the LCCs can adopt the hub system, for example, is
less certain.” But don’t be too fast to discount the innovative
LCCs. Since it has been around since the 1970s, low-cost
behemoth Southwest is a living case study of an aging LCC
and it has only seemed to get stronger. Regarding its pur-
ported disappearing cost advantages, “I’ve been saying that
about Southwest for about 30 years. So far aging has had no
major affect,” Greenlist says. 
In light of the changes that have taken place, economist
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